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Why Judicial Deference to Administrative FactFinding is Unconstitutional
Representative government and trial by jury are the heart and lungs
of liberty. Without them we have no other fortification against being
ridden like horses, fleeced like sheep, worked like cattle, and fed and
clothed like swine and hounds.
John Adams 1

I. INTRODUCTION
There are currently 1,792 federal administrative law judges
(ALJs), 2 but the five ALJs employed by the Securities & Exchange
Commission (SEC) have received more attention in the last five years
than the other 1,787 combined. The SEC has been widely attacked
for implementing what critics perceive as a strategy to prevent Article
III judges from adjudicating SEC enforcement actions and put as
many enforcement actions as possible in front of the SEC’s
own judges. 3
The Dodd-Frank Act made this possible. In reaction to the
excesses of the financial sector that led to that crisis, Congress in 2010
passed a significant package of financial accountability and regulatory
reforms, titled the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act. 4 One such reform granted the SEC increased
authority to bring enforcement actions before its own ALJs rather
than Article III judges. 5
Both the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times have since
concluded that post-Dodd-Frank enforcement actions heard by SEC

1. Alan B. Bookman, We the People, 80 FLA. B.J. 6, 6 (2006).
2. Office of Personnel Management, ALJs by Agency, OPM.GOV (last updated Mar. 2016),
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency.
3. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 21, 2014 9:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-tojudges-it-appoints-1413849590.
4. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (Jul. 21, 2010).
5. See, e.g., Russell G. Ryan, The SEC as Prosecutor and Judge, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2014
7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-the-sec-as-prosecutor-and-judge1407195362 (“[T]he 2010 Dodd-Frank law vastly expanded SEC discretion to charge
wrongdoers administratively.”).
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ALJs are systemically biased against defendants. 6 For example, SEC
ALJs find against defendants between eighty and ninety percent of the
time, whereas federal district court judges find against defendants in
only sixty-three to sixty-nine percent of SEC enforcement cases. 7
Furthermore, when the ALJ decisions are appealed to the SEC
commissioners, “[t]he commissioners decided in their own agency’s
favor concerning 53 out of 56 defendants in appeals—or 95%—from
January 2010 through this past March [2015].” 8 As the ALJs have
heard more cases, the SEC has taken longer to decide appeals of ALJ
decisions. 9 The icing on the cake is that SEC officials are choosing to
initiate proceedings before SEC ALJs, rather than before federal
district court judges, with increasing frequency; in 2014, the SEC
initiated eighty percent of its enforcement actions before ALJs rather
than federal district court judges. 10

6. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803;
Gretchen
Morgenson, At the S.E.C., a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at BU.1
(“The administrative forums also restrict defendants’ abilities to take depositions, obtain
documents from the government’s witnesses and conduct other discovery. The appeals process
is similarly narrow; defendants seeking a reversal must first go to the commission itself. If
unsuccessful there, they must go to a circuit court of appeals, which is typically hesitant to
question administrative law judges’ findings as they are considered experts in their areas, Mr.
Riccio [a professor and former dean of Seton Hall Law School] says. The S.E.C. says successful
appeals have been rare.”)
7. Eaglesham, supra note 6 (“The SEC says its judges are impartial and the process is
fair. It attributes the difference in outcomes partly to case mix. For instance, most of its
complicated insider-trading cases have been heard in federal court, not by its in-house judges.”);
see also Morgenson, supra note 6. Empirical evidence does support the SEC’s position;
specifically, Adam Pritchard and Stephen Choi found that the SEC does indeed send its most
complex cases to the federal district court, while retaining the so-called “easy cases” for
resolution by ALJ. Adam C. Pritchard & Stephen Choi, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative
Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH. SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY
(Working Paper No. 119, 2016), http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/119; see
also David Zaring, S.E.C.’s In-House Judges Not Too Tough, A Review Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
31,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/business/dealbook/secs-in-housejudges-not-too-tough-a-review-shows.html.
8. Eaglesham, supra note 6.
9. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Appeals Process on the Slow Track, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2015,
7:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-appeals-process-on-the-slow-track-1450743130.
10. Eaglesham, supra note 6 (“‘It is a fundamental change,’ said Joseph Grundfest, a
former SEC commissioner who is now a law professor at Stanford University. ‘By bringing more
cases in its own backyard, the agency is not only increasing its chances of winning but giving
itself greater control over the future evolution of legal doctrine.’”).
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One New York City securities attorney observed: “I’ve been
involved in these administrative proceedings for many years and have
been struck by the unfairness and lack of neutrality in the system. . . .
The judge’s mind-set reflects the agenda of the agency, which in this
arena is enforcement.” 11 Even in the absence of hard evidence of actual
bias, Professor Ronald J. Riccio has observed, “If you get caught up
in the web of an agency investigation, you’re investigated, prosecuted,
and judged by agency personnel. . . . Even if it doesn’t create actual
bias, it doesn’t look good.” 12
Several prominent businesspeople targeted by the SEC have
challenged the ALJs and their dramatically expanded caseloads on
constitutional grounds, with varying degrees of success. 13 For
example, Mark Cuban, the owner of the Dallas Mavericks and an
acquitted former SEC defendant, has been an outspoken opponent of
the SEC’s litigation “home-court advantage” for years. 14 This past
year, Lynn Tilton, an investment executive known for rescuing
struggling start-ups, joined the opposition when the SEC brought an

11. Morgenson, supra note 6; see also Eaglesham, supra note 6 (“One former SEC judge
said she thought the system was slanted against defendants at times. Lillian McEwen, who was
an SEC judge from 1995 to 2007, said she came under fire from Ms. [Brenda] Murray [the
SEC’s chief ALJ] for finding too often in favor of defendants. ‘She questioned my loyalty to the
SEC,’ Ms. McEwen said in an interview, adding that she retired as a result of the criticism. Ms.
McEwen said the SEC in-house judges were expected to work on the assumption that ‘the
burden was on the people who were accused to show that they didn’t do what the agency said
they did.’”); Jonathan Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST (May
24, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-ofgovernment/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7z1_story.html (“[A]gency
proceedings are often mockeries of due process, with one-sided presumptions and procedural
rules favoring the agency.”).
12. Morgenson, supra note 6.
13. See, e.g., Raymond J. Lucia Companies v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016); Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, 824
F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016); Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357, 2015 WL 5547463 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
17, 2015); Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15–CV–2106–LMM, 2015 WL 7597428 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 4, 2015).
14. See Todd Davis, Mark Cuban Takes His Grudge Against the SEC to the Supreme
MORNING
NEWS
(Mar.
16,
2016,
6:09
PM),
Court,
DALL .
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/business-headlines/20160316-mark-cuban-takeshis-grudge-against-the-sec-to-the-supreme-court.ece; Jean Eaglesham, Mark Cuban Latest
Fight With SEC: In-House Judges, WALL S T. J. (Sept. 15, 2015, 4:13 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/09/15/mark-cuban-latest-fight-with-sec-inhouse-judges/.
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enforcement action against her firm, Patriarch Partners. 15 Because of
this widespread backlash, the SEC “quietly pulled back on its use of
in-house judges,” 16 and modified its procedural rules to allow for more
discovery during ALJ adjudications. 17 However, to the extent that the
real issues with ALJ adjudications are constitutional rather than
political, these reforms fall short. 18
Criticisms of the administrative state that focus on separation-ofpowers or Appointments Clause issues 19 overlook another
fundamental constitutional question: Does (1) granting ALJs the
power to conduct jury-less fact-finding in what are essentially civil
actions, or (2) deferring to that fact-finding on appeal, violate the
Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
provides: “In suits at common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved . . . .”20 Under the Supreme Court’s “historical test,” any
15. See Jonathan Stempel, Lynn Tilton Sues SEC Again, Calls Cases Unconstitutional,
REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2016, 9:53 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-sec-tiltonidUKKCN11F2JX; Alison Frankel, Distressed Debt Diva Lynn Tilton on ‘Unfair’ SEC Trial: ‘You
Don’t Believe It Could Happen’, REUTERS (July 27, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2016/07/27/distressed-debt-diva-lynn-tilton-on-unfair-sec-trial-you-dont-believe-itcould-happen/.
16. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2015, 9:00
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-trims-use-of-in-house-judges-1444611604.
17. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Gives Ground on Judges, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2015, 8:03 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-gives-ground-on-judges-1443139425; Mark Schoeff, Jr.,
SEC Approves Reforms to In-House Process for Enforcement Cases, INV. NEWS (July 13, 2016,
12:47
PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160713/FREE/160719966?t
emplate=printart (“Parties will now have more time to prepare for a hearing and to be able to
take depositions, but concerns of fairness remain.”).
18. See Joseph Quincy Patterson, Many Key Issues Still Left Unaddressed in the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s Attempt to Modernize Its Rules of Practice, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1675 (April 2016); Eaglesham, supra note 17 (“Some critics say the changes don’t go far
enough.”); Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Finds Itself in a Constitutional Conundrum, N.Y. TIMES
(June 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/business/dealbook/sec-finds-itselfin-a-constitutional-conundrum.html; Suja A. Thomas & Mark Cuban, A Jury, Not the S.E.C.,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/17/business/dealbook/ajury-not-the-sec.html; Jean Eaglesham, SEC Faces ‘Crisis of Confidence’ Over In-House Court,
Ex-Official Says, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2015, 3:45 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-facescrisis-of-confidence-over-in-house-court-ex-officials-says-1449089157.
19. See, e.g, Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Finds Itself in a Constitutional Conundrum, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (June 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/business/
dealbook/sec-finds-itself-in-a-constitutional-conundrum.html (describing recent constitutional
challenges to SEC’s enforcement actions); Jonathan Stempel, SEC beats new challenge to in-house
judges in Atlanta federal court, REUTERS (June 17, 2016, 6:18 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-sec-court-proceedings-idUSKCN0Z32K6 (same).
20. U.S. CONST. amend VII.
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issue that a jury would have heard under 1789 English common law
must be heard by a jury today; 21 civil enforcement actions fall in this
category. Furthermore, even under an alternative historical
approach—based on the Framers’ original intent—in-house
enforcement actions, and judicial deference to administrative factfinding, fail the Seventh Amendment.
Part II will discuss the historical roots of the Seventh Amendment
and the development of the Supreme Court’s feeble Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence. Part III will discuss Suja Thomas’s work
on the unconstitutionality of summary judgment, upon which this
Comment is modeled. Part IV argues that in-house enforcement
actions without civil juries, and judicial deference to administrative
fact-finding, are unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment’s
historical test, as well as unconstitutional under the alternate
“legislative history” approach to the Seventh Amendment. Because
fact-finding by SEC ALJs is unconstitutional under either
interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, our country must take
steps to either reconcile the Seventh Amendment with current
administrative practice, or vice versa. The best answer would be to
require the SEC to bring its enforcement actions in federal district
court in the first instance. Although that change would create practical
and logistical problems, which Congress would need to address, that
process is most consistent with the original intent of the
Seventh Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Passage of the Seventh Amendment
When the Continental Congress issued the Declaration of
Independence on July 4, 1776, its members elected to include in that
document a specific list of grievances they had against King George
III’s administration in the American colonies. Between the more
obvious violations of human dignity named in that document—
“[P]rotecting [royal troops], by a mock Trial, from punishment for
any Murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these
States,” “[R]avag[ing] our Coasts, burn[ing] our towns, and
21. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L.
REV. 139, 147 (2007).
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destroy[ing] the lives of our people,” and forcing Americans captured
at sea “to bear Arms against their Country, to become the
executioners of their friends and Brethren” 22—the American colonists
expressed their outrage at King George III “[f]or depriving us in many
cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.” 23
Perhaps in our day it is surprising to see that the Framers so
revered the right to “Trial by Jury” that they were willing to publicly
condemn their king for depriving them of that right, framing it as part
of “a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct
object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny.” 24 Yet this was exactly
the tenor of the colonists’ feelings regarding this right: they viewed it
as a sacrosanct bulwark against the tyranny of the King’s judges. 25 In
a period when tensions were beginning to develop between the King
and his American subjects, it was common for royal judges to suspend
jury trials and hear cases themselves. 26 This deprived the American
colonists of the opportunity to inject their perspective into the
outcome of the case. On the other hand, when colonial juries were
allowed in court proceedings, the colonists invariably used the
opportunity to protest by nullifying the King’s allegedly oppressive
laws. 27 So it was that
[i]n the 1770s, the jury emerged as a symbol of the struggle for
independence. Its reputation as a defender of liberty meant that it was
destined to occupy a prominent place in the creation of the new state
governments. Indeed, the attachment to the jury was such that every
state constitution guaranteed the right to trial by jury in both civil
and criminal cases. 28

22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 17, 26, 28 (U.S. 1776).
23. Id. at para. 20; see Alan Howard Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages,
the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 148−49 (1991).
As shown below, this refers to both criminal juries and civil juries.
24. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
25. Scheiner, supra note 23, at 148–49.
26. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87
IOWA L. REV. 145, 164−67 (2001).
27. See id. at 159−68.
28. Id. at 168 (emphasis added); see Scheiner, supra note 23, at 149 (“During the later
ratification debate, Antifederalists held that one of the goals of the Revolution had been to win
back the civil jury trial right.”); see also Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 655 (1972) (“In fact, ‘[t]he right to trial by jury
was probably the only one universally secured by the first American state constitutions . . . .’ The
attachment to this form of trial was so strong that it was even prescribed to be used in prize cases
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When the Constitutional Convention met in the hot summer of
1787 to draft a new framework for the paralyzed new Confederacy,
the members of that Convention chose to lay out the scheme for a
national government stronger than what had existed under the
Articles of Confederation. 29 This new federal government, which
would share sovereignty with the state governments in a novel “federal
system,” would consist of a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary.30
Yet the new Constitution did not mention any claim to jury trial for
litigants under the proposed new government—rather, the proposal
had been briefly considered and then set aside. 31
This seemingly minor omission was a major stumbling block
during the Constitution’s ratification process—a weakness that the
Antifederalists latched onto in their opposition to the new
Constitution. 32 Indeed, “[e]ven before the Philadelphia Convention
adjourned, plans were being laid to attack the Constitution that was
eventually proposed because of the absence of any guarantee of civil jury
trial in the new federal courts.” 33 Some even went so far as to suggest
that the omission of explicit mention of the jury trial right in the
Constitutional text was part of an insidious Federalist plot to
surreptitiously smother the jury trial right altogether. 34 That Alexander
that were triable to the only central judicial authority created by the states under the Articles of
Confederation.”), quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1963 reprint) and citing ART. OF
CONFEDERATION, art. IX, in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 12–15 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909).
29. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 1783–1789 (2015).
30. Id.
31. Wolfram, supra note 28, at 656−60. Ironically, part of the reason the Constitutional
Convention didn’t further consider a civil jury trial guarantee was because they believed it would
be too difficult to specify which cases were entitled to civil jury trials, and which cases were not.
Id. at 663−64.
32. Scheiner, supra note 23, at 146, n.23 (“The civil jury trial right was the first right that
participants in the convention found missing from the new Constitution.”), citing Wolfram,
supra note 28, at 658−59; Harrington, supra note 26, at 184−85 (“It is . . . important to note
that antifederalist support for the civil jury was far more substantive than an argument that civil
juries were merely ‘a good thing.’”). The civil jury trial right was the first right that participants
in the convention found missing from the new Constitution. Id.
33. Wolfram, supra note 28, at 662 (emphasis added).
34. Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to
Jury Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 412 (1999) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998)) (“[T]he Antifederalists charged that this
omission was part of a Federalist conspiracy against civil juries, which had silently been banished
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Hamilton—who had no significant personal attachment to civil
juries—devoted his Federalist No. 83 solely to explaining why the
Constitution did not mention any right to a jury trial, and assuring
early Americans that the jury trial was not in danger, provides strong
evidence of the importance of the civil jury in its day. 35
Eventually, the Federalists were able to secure the needed state
approvals for ratification only by promising 36 that the first priority of
the new federal government would be to draft and put into effect a
Bill of Rights, which would inevitably include the civil jury trial right. 37
When the first Congress convened in 1789, James Madison made
good on this promise by introducing resolutions in the House of
Representatives to amend the Constitution to include guarantees of
individual rights. 38 Madison’s proposed amendments would be the
constitutional progenitors of what today is known as the Bill of Rights.
The original proposed language of the Seventh Amendment was: “In
from the federal courts.”); see also Brandon L. Boxler, Judicial Gatekeeping and the Seventh
Amendment: How Daubert Infringes Upon the Constitution Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 14 RICH.
J. OF L. & PUB. INT., no. 3, 2011, at 483 (“Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams, and George Mason
rallied opposition to the Constitution ‘by asserting that [it] would abolish civil
juries altogether.’”).
35. It was no secret that Alexander Hamilton, one of the chief proponents of the newly
drafted Constitution, was not as ideologically attached to the jury trial right as others among the
Framers. See Scheiner, supra note 23, at 146 n.21 (“Although Hamilton opposed the civil jury,
he recognized that some viewed it as the ‘very palladium of free government.’”); Harrington,
supra note 26, at 184; id. at 147 n.23 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 495 (Alexander
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)) (“The objection to the plan of the convention, which has
met with the most success in [New York], and perhaps in several of the other States, is that
relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in civil cases.”).
36. Wolfram, supra note 28, at 656 (“Ratification was ultimately achieved probably only
on the strength of assurances that the basic protections of a bill of rights would be incorporated
as amendments (or enacted as statutes, according to some assurances) at the first meeting of the
Congress provided for under the Constitution.”); see also id. at 672 (“[O]n the matter of civil
jury trial[, if not on the matter of the Constitution’s ratification generally,] the antifederalists
won. . . . [T]he antifederalist arguments concerning civil jury trial . . . ultimately prevailed.”).
Indeed, “[t]he antifederalist pressure did not relent after the Constitution was finally adopted,”
and “[m]any federalist candidates for elective office in the new federal government, such as
Madison, had to promise constituents that a bill of rights would promptly be made a part of the
Constitution by amendment.” Id. at 725.
37. Of course, there were numerous civil rights embodied in the Bill of Rights that were
important in the ratification debate as well. Nevertheless, the civil jury trial right played a special
role. See Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil
Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1010 (1992) (at the time of the Constitution’s ratification,
“[t]he only disagreement seem[ed] to be over whether civil jury rights were the most important
of all individual rights, or simply one of the most important rights”).
38. Klein, supra note 37, at 1018–20.
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suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as one
of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to
remain inviolate.” 39
After sparse debate and revision 40 (about which little is known 41),
this guarantee was eventually adopted in the form that we know today:
“In Suits at common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.” 42
With the benefit of more than two hundred years of hindsight, it
is safe to say that the general attitude of indifference toward the civil
jury right today, both among average Americans 43 and among the legal
community, 44 has drifted significantly from the Framers’ treatment of

39. Krauss, supra note 34, at 428 (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 493 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (quoting Proposal
by Madison in House (Jun. 8, 1789))).
40. Most importantly to the purposes of this Comment, the phrase “between man and
man” was eliminated from the final version of the amendment.
41. Harrington, supra note 26, at 212 (“There is little direct legislative history
surrounding the passage of the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury in
civil cases—or indeed, of any of the amendments proposed in the House by James Madison.
What is clear is that the jury trial right, like other proposed amendments, was designed to allay
the fears of those who believed that the Constitution did not contain adequate protections for
individual liberty.”).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
43. Scheiner, supra note 23, at 147 (“Today the seventh amendment stands emptied of
the political and moral content necessary to sustain it as a constitutional principle.”); see,
e.g., Dan Rodricks, Jury duty and the inconvenience of being a citizen, BALT. SUN (Apr. 6,
2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-04-06/news/bs-md-rodricks-040720130406_1_jury-duty-jury-pool-jury-selection; How to Get Out of Jury Duty,
WIKIHOW, http://www.wikihow.com/Get-Out-of-Jury-Duty (last visited Nov. 7, 2016)
(“While it is your duty to attend jury duty, there are some secrets to ‘getting out’ of it if it does
not fit into your life at the moment.”); Andrew Ferguson, What Every Harvard Law Student
Should Know About Juries, HARV. L. REV. (Nov. 25, 2015), http://hlrecord.org/2015/11/
what-every-harvard-law-student-should-know-about-juries/ (“Juries are in crisis. The jury trial
exists today unloved, neglected, and largely avoided in legal practice. Procedural barriers and
civic apathy have combined to gut one of the central tenets of America’s constitutional
structure.”); Alex Mayyasi, How A Lawsuit Over Hot Coffee Helped Erode the 7th Amendment,
PRICEONOMICS (Oct. 3, 2016), http://priceonomics.com/how-a-lawsuit-over-hot-coffeehelped-erode-the-7th/ (the famous Stella Liebeck ‘hot coffee lawsuit’ “is . . . arguably[] part
of a much larger story: the least publicized death of a constitutional right in the history of the
United States—the right to a trial by jury”).
44. The Supreme Court has generally taken a narrow, formalistic view of the jury’s
role in civil litigation . . . . This antiseptic conception of the jury’s purpose is
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the Seventh Amendment, which “was flush with historical, political,
and moral significance to the early Americans.” 45 Indeed, at the time
of the Constitution’s ratification,”[t]he only disagreement seem[ed]
to be over whether civil jury rights were the most important of all
individual rights, or simply one of the most important rights.” 46 This
decline in solicitude for the civil jury trial right has coincided with the
erosion of that right, 47 in part due to the rise of summary judgment in
federal court proceedings, as well as the doctrine of judicial deference
to administrative fact-finding, discussed below in Parts III and
IV, respectively.
B. Supreme Court’s Feeble Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court ostensibly claims to protect the civil jury trial
right. The Court has said, for example, “[m]aintenance of the jury as
a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place
in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the
right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.” 48 The
actual trajectory of the federal courts’ preservation of this right has
been far less exacting, and the courts have allowed the Seventh
Amendment guarantee to be “curtail[ed]” significantly. This modern
Seventh Amendment atrophy was precipitated by the Court’s
adoption, in the early twentieth century, of a weak and insufficient test
by which to assess Seventh Amendment claims. This frail test has
repeatedly proven to be inadequate in preserving the civil jury trial
right, 49 and indeed has led to the current situation with SEC ALJs.
inconsistent with the passion and violence with which the civil jury was defended
during the Revolutionary era and the constitutional ratification debate. The civil jury
trial provision was not a ‘technical amendment’ to the Constitution, but a crucial
element in the political bargain that permitted ratification.
Scheiner, supra note 23, at 145−46.
45. Id. at 146.
46. Klein, supra note 37, at 1010.
47. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 166 (1973) (quoting Galloway v. United States,
319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting)) (“Some . . . years ago, Mr. Justice Black
warned his Brethren against the ‘gradual process of judicial erosion which . . . has slowly worn
away a major portion of the essential guarantee of the Seventh Amendment.”).
48. Peter A. Arhangelsky, Note, Nullifying the Constitution: Federal Asbestos Tort Reform
and the Abrogation of Seventh Amendment Rights, 98 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 98 (2006)
(quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
49. See, e.g., Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional
Rights to Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811 (2013).
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To analyze whether a specific procedure or district judge’s actions
violate the Seventh Amendment, the Supreme Court declared that the
“measuring-stick” is a historically-based test. 50 At its foundations, the
“historical test” requires the appellate court to decide only whether a
jury would have been required to dispose of a certain claim under the
common law of England as it stood in 1791. 51 If a jury would have
been required in 1791, the Seventh Amendment (presumably)
requires a jury trial now. 52 Of course, as we move increasingly further
from the year 1791 with the passage of time, it becomes increasingly
difficult to map modern disputes onto the English common law as it
existed in 1791. 53
This is not the end of the analysis, however. The Supreme Court
has further explained that the Seventh Amendment was meant to
preserve only the “substance” 54 of the civil jury trial right, not its
“form” 55 or incidents. Therefore, Congress, the executive, and the
judiciary are free to alter those procedures and characteristics of the
jury trial that fall outside of the sacred “substance.” 56 A perverse twist
in this constitutional calculus is that
50. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
51. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV.
139, 147 (2007).
52. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 28, at 640 (“If a jury would have been impaneled in
this kind of case in 1791 English practice, then generally a jury is required by the
seventh amendment.”).
53. See Mark I. Greenberg, The Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Courts and
Administrative Agencies after Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 479, 483
(1990) (“Today, however, discerning whether a particular action would, in eighteenth-century
England, have come in the Chancery or the law courts can often prove difficult, as
Granfinanciera illustrates. In that case, the majority looked primarily to old English case law
and came to the conclusion that the Chancery court would have probably refused to hear an
action for the recovery of a fraudulent conveyance. Justice White, in dissent, analyzed much of
the same material and found the record inconclusive.”); Klein, supra note 37, at 1024.
54. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 51, at 147 (citing Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin
Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) and Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157−60 (1973)).
55. Id. (citing Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 498).
56. But see Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to
a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 610−11 (1984) (“It is reasonable to assume that the
framers foresaw an evolution of the common law and did not intend for the jury right to be lost
as soon as any major judicial reform was implemented. Neither the language of the amendment,
nor the available legislative history, however, supports the conclusion that the framers intended
that the focus of an inquiry into the limits of the right to a civil jury be only on the “substantive”
aspects of the trial, that is, the rights asserted and the remedies sought, and never on its
procedural elements. Accepting that the seventh amendment’s explicit call for the “preservation”
of rights existing at the time of ratification implied that a historical perspective is constitutionally
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[t]he Court has [never] defined what constitutes the substance of
the English common law jury trial in 1791. Instead the Court has
individually compared various common law procedures to modern
procedures. Under this approach, the Court has approved every
procedure that it has considered that removes cases from juries,
before, during, or after trials, even though such procedures did not
exist under the English common law. 57

This means that, under the current historical test, the original
“substance” of the civil jury trial right may hardly have been preserved
at all. Rather, perhaps the Court has simply declined to demarcate the
Seventh Amendment “substance” in order to be free to declare each
challenged procedure only a modification to the incidentals of the
common law jury trial. In this way, the Court can effectively mask
what in reality are modifications of the undefined “substance.” 58
Ultimately, the historical test has proven unable to protect the
Seventh Amendment against modern-day encroachment. The Seventh
Amendment has, for whatever reason, been afforded significantly less
vigorous judicial protection than other Constitutional rights. Federal
courts have long seen themselves as guardians of these rights:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and

required, there still remains a question as to whether, if one departs too far from the procedural
aspects of jury trials as they were conducted in 1791, one can still be said to be preserving the
right to jury trial.”).
57. Thomas, supra note 51, at 147; see also Paul B. Weiss, Comment, Reforming Tort
Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh Amendment?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 737, 737 (1988)
(“To date, the United States Supreme Court has artfully avoided any pronouncement of what
substantive jury functions are ‘preserved’ by the right to trial by jury in suits at common law, as
guaranteed by the seventh amendment to the Constitution . . . . [T]he Court has yet to define
in specific terms which substantive functions are so inherent to trial by jury, so elementary and
necessary, that the seventh amendment preserves them from judicial or
legislative encroachment.”).
58. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 49, at 811 (alteration in original) (“[B]oth state and
federal court[s] . . . adopted originalist tests [to apply civil jury trial rights]. These tests, however,
proved so flexible that they allowed legislatures and courts great discretion in modifying civil
jury trial.”).
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assembly, and other fundamental rights many not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. 59

In this guardian role, federal courts have extended substantial
protections to constitutional rights. Take, for example, the freedom of
speech laid out in the First Amendment. Content-neutral regulations
of speech (regulations, for example, of time, place and manner of
speech, but not of content) are subject to intermediate (also called
“heightened”) scrutiny review. 60 To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, the
speech regulation must be promulgated in response to a “substantial”
government interest, “closely” tailored to accomplish that interest (in
other words, the restriction does not apply to more speech than
necessary), and preserve ample alternative avenues for the speaker to
speak. 61 This is a difficult constitutional standard for any statute
to clear.
Even more stringent is the strict-scrutiny standard of review, which
is affectionately known among First Amendment scholars as “‘the kiss
of death,’ because it is almost always fatal when applied” 62 to a law
challenged under the First Amendment. Strict scrutiny is applied to
content-based regulations of speech—in other words, statutes that
regulate speech based on the ideas presented by the speaker. Under
strict scrutiny, the Court has invalidated laws that prevent convicted
criminals from profiting off memoirs detailing their crimes, 63 that
prohibit state judicial candidates from expressing views on
controversial political subjects, 64 and that ban flag burning. 65
The Court does not stop “at the water’s edge” in protecting free
speech rights, however, and has been more than willing to launch what
are best described as pre-emptive attacks against free speech violations

59. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
60. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S.
622 (1994).
61. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26–28 (2010) (citing Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)).
62. P.J. Puryear, Life After NCRL v. Leake: Can North Carolina’s Disclosure Laws Survive
a Constitutional Challenge?, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1252, 1259 (2009) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 380 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lecture by RonNell
Anderson-Jones, BYU Law School (October 2015) (on file with author).
63. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105 (1991).
64. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
65. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397; United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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under the chilling effect doctrine. 66 Under the most common usage of
the doctrine, “chilling effect refers to a concern that an otherwise
legitimate rule will curb protected expression outside its ambit. This
phenomenon generally arises when would-be speakers, faced with the
uncertainties of the legal process, refrain from making protected
statements.” 67 In other words, the regulation at issue changes the
incentives of the expression sufficiently for the would-be speaker to
refrain from exercising a constitutional right. This means that the
Supreme Court may invalidate “an otherwise legitimate law” based
solely on the nebulous possibility that the law will cause some speaker,
somewhere, to forgo exercising his or her constitutional right to
speak. 68 According to the Supreme Court, some constitutional rights
even cast “penumbras” that create ancillary rights, strong enough
themselves to void statutes for unconstitutionality. 69 In short, the
Court has provided formidable protection to other civil liberties.
The Seventh Amendment civil jury right, on the other hand,
enjoys no such protection. Under the historical test, procedures and
regulations are merely examined to determine whether they infringe
on the undefined “substance” of the Seventh Amendment, and if they
do, they are invalidated. There is no required showing of a substantial
(or even legitimate) governmental purpose for the regulation; there is
no requirement that the regulation be narrowly tailored to serve the
government’s interest. In fact, the “historical test” is even weaker in
practice than it is in theory: “[T]he Supreme Court has upheld
[against Seventh Amendment challenge] every new procedure that it
has considered by which a court removes cases from the determination
of a jury before, during, or after trial.” 70
Furthermore, there is no such thing as prophylactic protection for
the Seventh Amendment, as there is for the freedom of speech under
the chilling effect doctrine—even though the Seventh Amendment
66. For a general overview of the chilling effect doctrine, see Frederick Schauer, Fear,
Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978).
67. Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633,
1655 (2013) (emphasis omitted).
68. Id. at 1650.
69. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a
contraceptive use law that “intrude[d] upon the right of marital privacy,” a penumbral right
created by the First Amendment); id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); G. Sidney Buchanan,
The Right of Privacy: Past, Present, and Future, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 403 (1989).
70. Thomas, supra note 51, at 142.
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could sorely use such protection. For example, mandatory arbitration
arguably alters citizens’ incentives enough to discourage would-be
litigants from exercising their rights to jury trials at all. 71 If there were
the functional equivalent of a chilling effect doctrine in place to
protect the “penumbra” of the Seventh Amendment, it would offer at
least more protection (than the historical test) against possible civil
jury right violations brought about, for example, by compelled
arbitration 72 and summary judgment. 73
As discussed in Part III below, the Supreme Court has approved
substantive changes in the modern-day role of the civil jury that
arguably fail the historical test and certainly contradict the legislative
history behind the Seventh Amendment’s enactment. Specifically, one
of the great purposes of the jury trial was to prevent, or nullify, the
actions of oppressive or biased legislatures, executives, and
judiciaries. 74 Therefore, whenever a judge or an administrative agency
is allowed to act as fact-finder in civil suits in place of a jury, the
Seventh Amendment is or should be offended under the historical test.
III. “WHY SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL”
Some have made similar Seventh Amendment arguments against,
for example, summary judgment. According to Professor Suja
Thomas, for example, the 1938 canonization of summary judgment
proceedings in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure significantly (and
unconstitutionally) displaced the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury
right. 75 Proponents of summary judgment, of course, claim that the
procedure does not infringe on the jury trial right because it may only
be invoked to end proceedings where “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

71. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001).
72. See Cory Tischbein, Animating the Seventh Amendment in Contemporary Plaintiffs’
Litigation: The Rule, or the Exception?, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 233 (2013).
73. Thomas, supra note 51.
74. Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights
to Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811 (2013); Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s
Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries and the Rise of the Executive, the
Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2014) (“When
America was founded, juries functioned differently—as an integral part of government in both
England and the colonies.”).
75. Thomas, supra note 51.
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of law.” 76 Professor Thomas’ article served as a major influence on this
Note, and deserves a short summary here.
In analyzing a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, the
Supreme Court has explained that there is a genuine dispute of
material fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party”; 77 “the judge’s function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” 78
Additionally, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 79 However, even
if there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the judge may “deny
summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the
better course would be to proceed to a full trial.” 80
Under these standards, then, the federal judge acts as a proxy jury
in considering summary judgment. The judge effectively tries to step
into the jury’s shoes and decide whether any reasonable jury could,
based on the evidence produced, find for the nonmoving party. 81 If
the judge believes that there is no work for the jury to do, then the
judge is able to grant the motion for summary judgment and avoid
the difficulty and expense of conducting a civil jury trial.
However, according to Professor Thomas, Rule 56 summary
judgment does violate the Seventh Amendment historical test. 82
Professor Thomas begins by defining the “substance” of the civil jury
right—an important analysis that the Supreme Court has yet to
undertake. She identifies three important aspects of the civil jury trial’s
role under the English common law, which represent “the substance,”
or the “core principles” of the civil jury trial right at common law. 83
First, “the jury or the parties determined the facts.” 84 This was
accomplished either through a jury trial, or through the parties
stipulating to a certain version of the facts; the judge “never decided
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
77. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
78. Id. at 249.
79. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970),
superseded on other grounds by Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).
80. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948)).
81. Thomas, supra note 51, at 145–46.
82. See generally Thomas, supra note 51.
83. Thomas, supra note 51, at 143.
84. Id.
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the case without such a determination by the jury or the parties,
however improbable the evidence might be.” 85 Second, “only after the
parties presented evidence at trial and only after a jury rendered a
verdict, would a court ever determine whether the evidence was
sufficient to support a jury verdict”; if the court so found, the court
“would order a new trial.” 86 Finally, “a jury would decide every case
in which there was any evidence, however improbable the evidence
was, unless the moving party admitted the facts and conclusions of the
nonmoving party.” 87
Professor Thomas measures the Rule 56 summary judgment
procedure against these three principles—which, if truly the substance
of the common law civil jury right, must constitutionally be
preserved—and concludes that summary judgment fails constitutional
review by impermissibly modifying all three of these principles. First,
she writes, summary judgment impermissibly infringes on the jury’s
common law functions because “the court decides the case without a
jury or the parties deciding the facts. The court assesses the evidence,
decides what inferences from the evidence are reasonable, and decides
whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.” 88 The
fact that judges considering summary judgment motions are directed
to predict what a “reasonable jury” would find is a subtle indication
to the careful thinker that summary judgment treads on territory into
which the judge should not venture alone.
Second, Thomas argues that summary judgment under Rule 56 is
unconstitutional because the court weighs the sufficiency of the
evidence the parties have presented before trial, rather than after, as at
common law. 89 Thomas’ third observation is that summary judgment
allows a moving party to be granted judgment as a matter of law
without admitting to the evidence and facts alleged by the nonmoving
party. 90 Whether or not judges believe they are “weighing evidence”
in an impermissible manner, Rule 56 removes evidence determinations

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Thomas, supra note 51, at 160.
Id.

1503

4.GIBBONS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/21/2017 11:57 AM

2016

from the jury in a manner that did not—and could not—exist under
the English common law. 91
Additionally, she dismisses the suggestions that summary
judgment is just a modern form of common law procedures such as
the demurrer to the pleadings, 92 the demurrer to the evidence, 93 the
nonsuit, 94 the special case, 95 and the new trial, 96 none of which
modified the three principles that Professor Thomas identified as the
substance of the common law. Overall, Professor Thomas’ piece
analyzes the historical test’s contours with greater detail and depth
than anything the Supreme Court has produced.
Ultimately, Professor Bronsteen probably said it best when he
wrote, “[s]ummary judgment might be a wonderful procedure were
it not inefficient, unfair, and unconstitutional.” 97 Unfortunately for
the Seventh Amendment, summary judgment is not the only recent
jurisprudential development that has narrowed the civil jury trial
guarantee. This Comment next discusses the significant effect that
chaining federal courts to administrative agencies’ fact-finding has had
on the civil jury trial right.
IV. WHY JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE FACTFINDING IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Another doctrine that deprives the civil jury of its constitutionally
apportioned fact-finding function—and therefore violates the Seventh
Amendment—is judicial deference to fact-finding by administrative
adjudicatory proceedings. 98 More and more, Congress creates
91. See, e.g., Richard L. Steagall, The Recent Explosion in Summary Judgments Entered by
the Federal Courts Has Eliminated the Jury from the Judicial Power, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 469, 469
(2009) (citing D. Theodore Rave, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 875, 884 nn.57–58 (2006)) (“Today summary judgment is granted on issues of
reasonableness, state of mind, and credibility, results that were [once] inconceivable.”).
92. Thomas, supra note 51, at 148–50.
93. Id. at 150–54.
94. Id. at 154–56.
95. Id. at 156–57.
96. Id. at 157–58.
97. John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522,
551 (2006).
98. See Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court’s
Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1977) (“The decision of
the Supreme Court in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission has
seriously weakened the protection afforded by the seventh amendment to the United
States Constitution.”).
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administrative agencies to enforce various civil laws, write regulations,
and administer penalties, 99 as well as adjudicate disputes arising under
those laws and regulations. 100 Congress has also decided, in many cases
where the administrative agencies’ decisions are subject to judicial
review, 101 that the factual findings of the administrative agencies will
be given deference by—and therefore be effectively binding on—the
federal court. 102 There is no jury because all of the facts are effectively
99. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231 (1994).
100. “Administrative agencies currently adjudicate more disputes than federal courts.”
David A. Brown, Note, Collateral Estoppel Effects of Administrative Agency Determinations:
Where Should Federal Courts Draw the Line?, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 817 (1988).
Furthermore, “[i]n 2001, the U.S. government had 1,370 Administrative Law Judges (ALJs)—
more than twice the number of Article III judges . . . . Although it is unclear how many of these
administrative proceedings are ‘trials’ in the traditional sense, what is clear is that more disputes
are now being resolved outside our judicial system than inside it.” David J. Beck, The
Consequences of the Vanishing Trial: Does Anyone Really Care?, 1 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF THE
RECORD 29, 35–36 (2010) (emphasis in original).
There are currently thirty-four federal agencies that use administrative law judges to adjudicate
disputes under the civil laws the respective agencies are authorized to enforce: the Coast Guard,
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Department of Agriculture, the Department
of Health and Human Services (Department Appeals Board and the Office of Medicare Hearings
and Appeals), the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of the
Interior, the Department of Justice (Executive Office for Immigration Review), the Department
of Labor, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Communications
Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Labor Relations
Authority, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, the
International Trade Commission, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the National Labor
Relations Board, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, the Office of Financial
Institution Adjudication, the Patent and Trademark Office, the Postal Service, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Small Business Administration, and the Social Security
Administration. Agencies Employing Administrative Law Judges, ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES,
http://www.aalj.org/agencies-employing-administrative-law-judges (last visited Oct. 8, 2016).
101. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). However, some administrative fact-finding is not subject to
judicial review in any form. See, e.g., Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues Arising in Federal Court
Appeals of ASCS Decisions Administering Federal Farm Programs, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 633,
638–39 (1988) (pointing out that 7 U.S.C. § 1385 prohibits judicial review of certain
Department of Agriculture determinations).
102. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside
agency . . . findings . . . found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute . . . .”); Judah A. Shechter, Note, De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Factual Determinations Implicating Constitutional Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1483,
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pre-determined by the administrative agency’s proceedings.103
Through incremental doctrinal development, which culminated with
the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 104
the Supreme Court has held that such deference does not violate the
Seventh Amendment. However, as discussed below in Sections IV.A
through IV.C, the Supreme Court decided this question incorrectly;
judicial deference to administrative fact-finding—even when analyzed
under the historical test’s malleable requirements, fails to pass
constitutional muster and operates in direct contradiction to the
Framers’ intent in passing the Seventh Amendment.
A. The “Appellate Review Model” and the Supreme Court’s
Misguided Approval
The Supreme Court did not arrive at its Atlas Roofing holding
overnight. Rather, Atlas Roofing was merely the most recent
manifestation of a deeply embedded jurisprudential trend known as
the “appellate review model of administrative law.” 105 Criticism of
these court decisions has largely centered on the separation-of-powers
doctrine undergirding the constitutional structure. 106 There has not

1483 (1988) (“With the rise of the modern administrative state, . . . courts have ceded much
ordinary fact-finding and law application to agencies, subject to only limited judicial review.”).
103. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (stating that in judicial review of decisions of the
Occupational Safety & Health Commission, “[t]he findings of the Commission with respect to
questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall
be conclusive”).
104. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
105. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 943 (2011) (“[T]he appellate
review model is so thoroughly embedded in contemporary administrative law that modern
lawyers take it for granted.”).
106. Modern constitutional law scholars frequently suggest that the appellate review model
of administrative law violates the plain meaning of Article III of the Constitution. They argue
that Article III vests the “judicial power of the United States” exclusively in courts composed of
judges who enjoy life tenure and secure compensation. The judicial power, it is further assumed,
includes the power to find both the facts and the law needed to resolve particular cases and
controversies. The appellate review model, however, calls for a sharing of this power with federal
tribunals that do not have the independence of Article III courts. The appellate review model,
from this perspective, represents a major challenge: Is there a principled justification for what
appears to be a violation of the plain requirements of the Constitution? Id. at 979−80
(citation omitted).

1506

4.GIBBONS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1487

1/21/2017 11:57 AM

Judicial Deference to Administrative Fact-Finding

been, as yet, much serious discussion on the Seventh Amendment
implications of the appellate review model. 107
The appellate review model sees the relationship between
administrative agencies and the Article III judges who review their
decisions as analogous to that which exists between trial court judges
and appellate court judges. The administrative agency (like a trial
court) is seen as entitled to deference on appeal with regard to certain
decisions. 108 Under this model, the administrative agency (like a trial
court or trial jury) is more capable at making accurate factual findings,
and therefore the reviewing court should give such findings deference
and disturb them only if they are not based in
“substantial evidence.” 109
Professor Thomas Merrill, a constitutional scholar at Columbia
Law School, describes in depth the historical development of the
appellate review model, tracing its origins far past the commonly
accepted starting point of the doctrine110 (generally supposed to be the
decision in Crowell v. Benson 111). Indeed, “[r]ecovering the early
history of the appellate review model allows us to understand why one
of the most significant constitutional questions posed by the rise of
the modern administrative state 112 was never seriously deliberated by

107. Even in a seventy-page article discussing in great detail the doctrine that developed
to prevent federal courts from reviewing administrative agencies’ factual findings in civil
proceedings, Professor Merrill does not mention the Seventh Amendment once. Id. at 939. This
is not a criticism of Professor Merrill; however, the idea that judicial deference to administrative
fact-finding could be unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment is conspicuously absent
from the cases that Professor Merrill discusses. The sole exception is Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22 (1932), where the Court summarily rejected the Seventh Amendment argument because the
case at hand was a maritime case within the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, and therefore the
Seventh Amendment did not apply. Id. at 45. Later cases, where the Seventh Amendment
presumably should apply, do not raise this argument further.
108. Merrill, supra note 105, at 941 (“The reviewing court conceives of its role vis-à-vis
the administrative agency in terms of the conventions that govern the appeals court-trial
court relationship.”).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 943−44.
111. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
112. To Professor Merrill, these were questions raised by the doctrine of the separation-ofpowers. Even his very thorough seventy-page law review article on the development of the
appellate review model fails to discuss the implications of the appellate review model for the civil
jury trial right preserved by the Seventh Amendment.
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the Supreme Court,” because that “model was adopted twenty years
before the decision in Crowell.” 113
The appellate review model began at the creation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887, “the first major national
regulatory agency.” 114 The ICC’s decisions and factual determinations
were given little deference when reviewed by Article III federal courts
under what was effectively de novo review. 115 The ICC eventually
buckled under the weight of the Supreme Court’s cavalierly nondeferential review of ICC determinations. According to Stephen
Skowronek, “[b]y 1896−97, the Court was openly declaring that it
was not bound by the conclusions of the commission, that it could
admit additional evidence, and that it could set aside the commission’s
findings altogether,” 116 and “[t]he Court’s aggressive review
threatened to reduce the ICC to the status of ‘a mere statisticsgathering agency.’” 117
Lest the country’s first foray into the promising world of
administrative law be abandoned to ignominious defeat, Congress
(after significant debate) passed the Hepburn Act, 118 which granted
the ICC additional power. 119 Professor Merrill writes:
From the perspective of the Supreme Court, the message encoded
in the Hepburn Act was twofold. First, the public and the politicians
were deeply unhappy with the Court’s existing practices regarding
judicial review of ICC rate orders. Second, Congress and the
President had provided no direction regarding what to do about it.
The net effect was to delegate authority to the Court to decide on
the new standard of review, with the implied threat that if the Court

113. Merrill, supra note 105, at 943−44.
114. Id. at 950.
115. Id. at 950−53 (“[T]he breadth of review of agency action in the nineteenth century
varied, but the nature of the review was uniformly what we would now call de novo, certainly as
to the development of the record. The understanding that courts would develop the record for
review exerted a powerful pull on the standard of review, and so the tenor of review even in
statutory review cases was nearly always one of independent judgment. There was little rhetoric
of deference, and even less evidence of it in practice.”).
116. Merrill, supra note 105, at 953–54 (citing S TEPHEN S KOWRONEK , B UILDING
A N EW A MERICAN S TATE : T HE E XPANSION OF A DMINISTRATIVE C APACITIES 1877–1920,
at 154−55 (1982).
117. Merrill, supra note 105, at 954 (quoting SKOWRONEK, supra note 116, at 151).
118. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
119. Merrill, supra note 105, at 955−59.
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did not back off from its aggressive review practices, more drastic
action would be in the offing. 120

The Court did, in fact, “back off”; shortly thereafter, small
glimpses of the appellate review doctrine began to show up in the
Supreme Court’s opinions. 121 For example, in Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 122 the Court
“emphasiz[ed] the law-fact distinction familiar to judges from the
conventions associated with judicial review of jury verdicts” and
declined to intrude into the ICC’s factual findings at issue in the
case. 123 Additionally, in Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Railway Co.
v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 124 the Supreme Court established
the “clear and unmistakable error” standard, “invoking the language
used to review factual determinations of judges sitting without
a jury.” 125
Finally, in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 126 “we witness the birth of the famous ‘substantial
evidence’ standard of review of agency findings of fact. The standard
was borrowed—without citation of authority—from the established
understanding of the standard of review that an appeals court applies
in reviewing a jury verdict.” 127 In other words, the Supreme Court
was putting the final touches on the appellate review model; a federal
court reviewing administrative agency actions would review the
agency’s factual findings under the same standard of review as if the
findings had been made by a duly impaneled civil jury. The separationof-powers concerns about the doctrine were essentially ignored; 128 the
Court did not even feel the need to address the Seventh Amendment.

120. Id. at 959 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 959−63.
122. 206 U.S. 441 (1907).
123. Merrill, supra note 105, at 960−61.
124. 206 U.S. 142 (1907).
125. Merrill, supra note 105, at 961.
126. 222 U.S. 541 (1912).
127. Merrill, supra note 105, at 961−62.
128. Merrill, supra note 105, at 972−79 (describing the scholarly work of John Dickinson
in encouraging and ‘cheerleading’ the growth of the appellate review model, and noting that
“Dickinson’s indifference to the Article III implications of delegating the fact-finding mission
to administrative agencies both reflected existing precedent and helped shape the Court’s
response when the issue finally came to the fore in 1930s.”).
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Eventually, in the Mann-Elkins Act, 129 Congress created the
Commerce Court, “a specialized Article III tribunal devoted
exclusively to review of ICC decisions.” 130 Professor Merrill notes that
the Mann-Elkins Act’s passage “arguably ratified—or at least signaled
[Congress’] strong approval of—the Supreme Court’s newly
deferential stance toward review of decisions of the ICC.” 131 In fact,
the Commerce Court was eventually disbanded because, among other
things, the Commerce Court “engaged in very aggressive review of
ICC decisions.” 132 Later manipulation of the appellate review model
in Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cases—declaring certain issues to
be issues of law rather than fact, and therefore subject to full review in
federal courts—prompted Chief Justice Taft to “remind[] his
colleagues that ‘[they] should scrupulously comply with the evident
intention of Congress that the Federal Commission be made the factfinding body and that the Court should in its rulings preserve the
Board’s character as such.’” 133 Since these formative years, “the
appellate review model [has become] so thoroughly embedded in
contemporary administrative law that modern lawyers take it
for granted.” 134
This brings us to Atlas Roofing, a manifestation of the continuing
vitality of the appellate review doctrine and the most recent analysis of
the appellate review doctrine under the Seventh Amendment. In a
unanimous decision, the Court upheld, against a Seventh Amendment
challenge, statutorily-prescribed judicial deference to administrative
fact-finding pertaining to employment law violations. 135 In Atlas
Roofing, an employer appealed the Occupational Safety and Health

129. Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910).
130. Merrill, supra note 105, at 965.
131. Id. at 966.
132. Id. at 966−67.
133. Id. at 971 (quoting FTC v. Curtis Pub. Co., 260 U.S. 568, 583 (1923) (Taft,
C.J., doubting)).
134. Merrill, supra note 105, at 943; cf. Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern
Administrative State is Inconsistent with the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. 491, 503 (2008) (“The
proliferation of these administrative agencies . . . starts from the assumption that these agencies
are a part of the modern constitutional order. Accordingly, the rearguard battle that we have to
fight today is whether the same kind of judicial discipline applies to the output of administrative
agencies as it does to the combination of work that follows the usual patterns of Congressional
legislation and Presidential enforcement.”).
135. Justice Blackmun recused himself. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 461 (1977).
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Review Commission’s determination that the employer’s working
conditions had breached the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA). 136 As required by OSHA, 137 when the employers appealed
the Commission’s determinations to the federal appeals courts, the
Commission’s factual findings were binding, and the case was never
submitted to a civil jury for fact-finding. 138 The Supreme Court held
that this administrative fact-finding procedure did not violate the
Seventh Amendment, on the grounds that cases like this involved
“statutory public rights” rather than “private rights,” and that civil
litigation related to “public rights” was not guaranteed a jury trial at
the common law. 139
This reasoning tracks the second of two theories discussed by
Professor Merrill that modern scholars attempt to use to reconcile the
appellate review model with Article III. The first, the “adjunct
theory,” posits that in cases where the federal courts defer to
administrative fact-finding, the agencies are essentially “functioning as
‘adjuncts’ to courts, in a manner analogous to the way juries function
in trials at law.” 140 The second theory (to which the Atlas Roofing
opinion subscribes) draws a distinction between administrative
adjudications involving “public rights” and those involving “private
rights.” 141 Under this approach, cases involving private rights may be
more thoroughly reviewed in federal court, while those involving
public rights may not. 142
However, this Comment argues that the Supreme Court wrongly
decided Atlas Roofing because it failed to properly analyze judicial
deference to administrative fact-finding under the historical test.
Furthermore, (putting aside the much-maligned historical test),
trying administrative cases without civil juries contradicts the

136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78 (2012).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (2012) (“The findings of the Commission with respect to
questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall
be conclusive.”).
138. Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 448.
139. Id. at 455–56.
140. Merrill, supra note 105, at 981−82. The adjunct theory attracts several important
criticisms, however, chief among which is the correct observation “that juries . . . have a direct
basis in the constitutional text, whereas adjudication by federal administrative agencies does not.
Juries are mentioned both in Article III and in the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 982.
141. Id. at 984.
142. Id.
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legislative history behind the Seventh Amendment’s drafting and
ratification, and therefore fails constitutional scrutiny even outside of
the Supreme Court’s test.
B. Deference to Administrative Fact-Finding Fails the Supreme
Court’s Historical Test
The settled analysis for whether a given procedure or statute
violates the Seventh Amendment is the historical test. 143 As discussed
in Section II.B, there are essentially two routes to applying this test.
To determine whether a specific cause of action requires a jury trial
right under the historical test, the appellate court must decide whether
a jury would have been required to dispose of a certain claim under
the 1791 English common law. 144 The second route applies to
procedures and devices, which must not infringe on the Seventh
Amendment’s “substance,” 145 but may alter or eliminate its “form”146
or incidents. Therefore, Congress, the executive, and the judiciary are
free to alter those procedures and characteristics of the jury trial as
long as they do not interfere with the “substance.” Of course, as
discussed above, the Supreme Court has never defined exactly what
constitutes the substance of the Seventh Amendment right, and
therefore has approved every new procedure or doctrine that litigants
have claimed to be violations of the Seventh Amendment. 147 This
Comment argues that judicial deference to administrative fact-finding
in enforcement actions fails the historical test under either route.
1. Enforcement actions to recover a civil penalty require a jury trial as
of right
If we view the issue as a question of whether a specific cause of
action (in this case, a civil enforcement action) requires a civil jury trial
right, in-house enforcement actions, and judicial deference to the factfinding therein, fail the historical test. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
143. See supra Section II.B.
144. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 31, at 640 (“If a jury would have been impaneled in
this kind of case in 1791 English practice, then generally a jury is required by the
seventh amendment.”).
145. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 51, at 147 (citing Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin
Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) and Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156−57 (1973)).
146. Id. (citing Gasoline Products Co., 283 U.S. at 498).
147. Id.
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Nordberg, the Court divided the cause-of-action route for the
historical test into two parts: “First, we compare the statutory action
to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the
merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the
remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable
in nature.” 148
As to the first element of the Granfinanciera formulation,
government actions for recovery of civil penalties fall into the class of
actions that would have been brought in common law courts, as
shown by the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. Several scholars have
argued persuasively that the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 149 is of
particular relevance when determining the legislative intent behind the
Seventh Amendment. 150 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has said that
“[t]he Judiciary Act . . . was passed by the first Congress assembled
under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in
framing that instrument, and is contemporaneous and weighty
evidence of its true meaning.” 151 Of special relevance to the current
inquiry is section nine of the Judiciary Act of 1789, stating:
the district courts . . . shall also have exclusive original cognizance of
all seizures on land, or other waters than as aforesaid, made, and of
all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the
United States. . . . And the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts,
in all causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
shall be by jury. 152

That the Framers considered it appropriate for cases involving
“penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United
States” to be heard by civil juries is powerful evidence that the
common law presumption was that such cases would be brought in
common law courts, rather than equity courts. 153 Additionally, as the

148. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Norberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989).
149. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 et seq. (1789).
150. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 27, at 149−50 (arguing that the Seventh Amendment
language “shall be preserved” refers to “the compromise already embodied in the Judiciary Act
[of 1789],” rather than the 1791 English common law).
151. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1887).
152. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. at 77, § 9(a), (d) (emphasis added).
153. See also Brief for Petitioner, Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev.
Comm’n, No. 75-748, 75-746 (1976), 1976 WL 194263 at *17 (“[A] governmental
proceeding for a civil penalty for violation of a statute would have been triable to a jury, whether
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petitioners in Atlas Roofing pointed out, the Supreme Court has said
that “in a just sense, [the Seventh Amendment] may well be construed
to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction,
whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle
legal rights.” 154
Regarding the second element of the Granfinanciera formulation
of the historical test, the remedy sought—a civil penalty—is legal, not
equitable, by nature. For the purposes of the lawsuit, the civil penalty
operates as a monetary damages award to the government, 155 and as
every first-year Contracts student learns, a claim for money damages
was traditionally a claim at common law, not at equity. 156
Therefore, an administrative agency’s lawsuit to recover a civil
penalty is best viewed as a legal cause of action for which parties to the
litigation would have a civil jury trial right. On this point, it is
significant to note that had the claim in Atlas Roofing been brought
originally in a federal district court, there would have been a right to
civil jury trial, even though no such right existed when the claim was
originally brought in an administrative proceeding. 157 Whether
Congress may permissibly assign an administrative agency to
adjudicate the dispute is a separation-of-powers question that is
beyond the scope of this Comment. What is highly relevant to the
Seventh Amendment, however, is how the federal courts treat the
factual findings of the agency once given the chance to review the
administrative proceedings. And under the Seventh Amendment’s
historical test, viewing enforcement actions as a claim for money
damages presents serious constitutional issues when Article III courts
defer to administrative fact-finding.

the proceeding was brought by a representative of the Crown or by an informer on behalf of
the Crown.”).
154. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 153, at *23 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at *17.
156. See, e.g., 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 32 (“In general, equity does not have jurisdiction
in cases in which the remedy sought is the recovery of money, whether as collection on a debt
or as damages. Actions to recover money are generally considered actions at law.”).
157. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 153, at *17. The Supreme Court has held, however,
that where the rights being adjudicated are “private rights” rather than “public rights,” the
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial may still apply even to administrative proceedings. Mark
I. Greenberg, The Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Courts and Administrative Agencies
after Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 479 (1990) (discussing
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)).
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2. Judicial deference infringes on the jury trial right’s substance
Coming at the historical test from the second approach
(substance-versus-incidents), the historical test demands that the
procedural rules governing deference not infringe on the actual
“substance” of the Seventh Amendment right. Therefore, we must
first define the substance of the civil jury trial right, for which
definition we turn to Professor Thomas. 158
a. The jury finds facts. First, “the jury or the parties determined
the facts.” 159 This was accomplished either through a jury trial, or
through the parties stipulating to a certain version of the facts; the
judge “never decided the case without such a determination by the
jury or the parties, however improbable the evidence might be.”160
Additionally, “a jury would decide every case in which there was any
evidence, however improbable the evidence was, unless the moving
party admitted the facts and conclusions of the nonmoving party.” 161
Under these principles, a Seventh Amendment challenge to
judicial deference seems to be an easy case. The Supreme Court has
said that the Seventh Amendment preserves the civil jury right’s
“substance,” and, as Professor Thomas has argued, the substance is
the principle that “the jury or the parties determined the facts.” 162 To
have an arm of the executive branch effectively predetermine the facts
in a federal judicial proceeding obviously violates this principle, 163 and
should therefore be held unconstitutional under the historical test’s
“substance” approach.
Judicial deference also falls short of satisfying the second
“substance” principle applicable here—that “a jury would decide
every case in which there was any evidence, however improbable the

158. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV.
139 (2007).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. In the technical sense that the entity adjudicating an administrative proceeding is also
ultimately the same entity prosecuting the claim, one could argue that the parties have
determined the facts where deference is given to administrative fact-finding. However, allowing
an executive arm of the government to determine the facts of a dispute clearly defeats the
legislative history of the Seventh Amendment, discussed below in Section IV.C.
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evidence was.” 164 Conversely, under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), the general rule, where formal adjudication occurs, is that the
administrative body will take evidence 165 and make factual findings,166
and any federal court eventually reviewing administrative
adjudications will “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and
conclusions
found
to
be . . .
unsupported
by
167
substantial evidence.”
Consider a hypothetical: the fictional Federal Eggs and Cheese
Commission initiates administrative proceedings against a dairy farmer
to assess a civil penalty for violating a National Cheese Curd Quality
Act. In the resulting administrative adjudication, the farmer presents
evidence that the she is compliant with the statutory requirements. As
long as the Eggs and Cheese Commission can martial “substantial
evidence” that the farmer is not in compliance with the statute, the
Commission may find against the dairy farmer, and those findings will
not be disturbed upon judicial review of the proceedings—even
though this is essentially a question of judgment that could go either
way. 168 For administrative fact-finding to bind the reviewing court
except where the fact-finding is so outrageous as to be “unsupported
by substantial evidence” constitutes a wholesale displacement of the
civil jury trial right, which required that “a jury would decide every
case in which there was any evidence.” 169
b. The public-right/private-right fiction. A final point: the publicright/private-right dichotomy that determined the outcomes in both
Atlas Roofing and Granfinanciera did not even exist in 1791 English
common law, 170 and therefore should not be the deciding factor for a
164. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139,
143 (2007).
165. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012).
166. § 557(c) (“The record shall show the ruling on each finding, conclusion, or exception
presented. All decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative decisions, are a part of
the record and shall include a statement of—(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or
basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record; and
(B) the appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.”).
167. § 706(2)(E).
168. This is similar to the “abuse-of-discretion” standard of review for reviewing trial
judge’s discretionary actions; the question is not whether the trial judge made the best decision,
but rather only whether the trial judge’s decision was rational.
169. Thomas, supra note 164, at 143 (emphasis added).
170. “The public rights rule had to be created to decide the Atlas [Roofing] case; it is not
the holding of any earlier opinion.” Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury:
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right that, according to the historical test, is based on 1791 English
jurisprudence. To reach this public rights exception, the Supreme
Court falsely analogized common law tax proceedings, which were
executive actions, to civil penalty enforcement actions. 171 In fact, no
such power existed outside the realm of tariffs and internal
revenue proceedings. 172
At any rate, the public-right/private-right distinction is simply not
a sturdy deciding factor on which to base the enjoyment of
constitutional rights. 173 For example, the Court in Atlas Roofing
maintained that no jury trial was required because the Occupational
Safety and Health Commission was enforcing public rights, rather
than private rights. 174 This is true, in the sense that the Commission
was enforcing worker safety standards, grounded in congressionally
approved public policy, against employers who might take advantage
of such workers. In other words, as the Supreme Court said in

The Supreme Court’s Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1287 (1977);
Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court’s Assault on the
Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1293−311 (1977) (declaring that “there is no
evidence that anyone in 1791 understood there was such an open-ended exception [as the public
rights exception]” and saying that the Court’s discussion of this right is based on a “misuse of
precedent”); Joseph Czerwien, Note, Preserving the Civil Jury Right: Reconsidering the Scope of
the Seventh Amendment, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 429, 430 (2014) (arguing that “[t]his ‘public
rights exception’ is inconsistent with the amendment’s purpose”); id. at 448 n.130 (citing
Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial In Non-Article
III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
407 (1995) (criticizing the public rights exception)).
171. Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court’s
Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1299−305, 1311−28 (1977)
(calling the majority opinion “a clear example of misuse of precedent”).
172. Id. at 1299 (calling the majority opinion “a clear example of misuse of precedent”).
173. “The term ‘public rights’ was coined in the mid-nineteenth century to describe a class
of rights, disputes over which could be conclusively resolved by the executive or legislative
branches of the federal government, without participation by the judiciary. Thus, causes of action
involving public rights do not necessarily enjoy adjudication by a judge whose independence is
guaranteed by Article III. But it is not clear why such causes of action should also be free of the
commands of the Seventh Amendment. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never provided a
workable definition of public rights.” Mark I. Greenberg, The Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article
III Courts and Administrative Agencies after Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 479, 481 (1990) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has said that “[t]he distinction
between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents.
Nor is it necessary to do so in the present cases . . . .” Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982).
174. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442,
450 (1977).
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Granfinanciera, “a public right [is] a statutory right closely
intertwined with a federal regulatory scheme.” 175
However, the Commission’s actions, while “closely intertwined
with a federal regulatory scheme,” also heavily implicate what are
(outside of administrative law) generally considered private rights. For
example, the employers were fined for violating civil laws and
therefore deprived of their financial resources. 176 Together, the two
employers in Atlas were fined $5,935 for OSHA violations 177—
$23,588.49 in 2016 dollars. And it seems absurd, with respect to both
the common law in 1791, 178 and the legislative history discussed below
in Section IV.B, that the employers would be entitled to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment only if the party seeking to exact
$5,935 were another private individual rather than the federal
Leviathan. 179 Since the Framers viewed the Seventh Amendment, as
with the rest of the Bill of Rights, as a protection against
government, 180 at the very least we should allow the “historical test”
to be slightly more historically informed. Consider this statement by
the preeminent English legal mind, William Blackstone:
Every new tribunal erected for the decision of facts, without the
intervention of a jury, (whether composed of justices of the peace,
commissioners of the revenue, judges of a court of conscience, or

175. Czerwien, supra note 170, at 448 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S.
33, 54−55 (1989) and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011) (affirming this model
of public rights)).
176. Criticizing the SEC’s use of administrative law judges, Professor Ronald J. Riccio said
that “[t]here’s no reason not to have an independent corps of hearing examiners . . . . When you
look at what’s at stake—a person’s livelihood—why should that be subjected to second-class due
process?” Morgenson, supra note 6.
177. Atlas Roofing Co., 3 OSAHRC 19, at *7 (No. 1130, 1973) ($600 penalty); Frank
Irey, Jr., Inc., 4 OSAHRC 1, at *17−18 (No. 701, 1973) ($5,335 penalty).
178. This even seems to violate ideas as old, for instance, as Magna Carta’s provision that
“No freeman is to be . . . disseised of his free tenement or of his liberties or free customs, . . .
save by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” MAGNA CARTA cl. 29 (1215).
179. This seems roughly analogous to denying a criminal defendant the right to a jury trial
because the prosecutor is merely ‘enforcing public rights.’ In fact, the proposition of denying
the right to a jury trial in a criminal case seems ridiculous because of the Sixth Amendment. Why
should the same deprivation seem less ridiculous in administrative enforcement proceedings,
given the Seventh Amendment?
180. See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Liberty Through Limits: The Bill of Rights as Limited
Government Provisions, 62 S.M.U. L. REV. 1745 (Fall 2009).
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any other standing magistrates) is a step towards establishing . . . the
most oppressive of absolute governments. 181

Measured against these principles, judicial deference to
administrative fact-finding impermissibly violates the substance of the
Seventh Amendment right. In fact, deference seems to fit well within
Justice Marshall’s language in his Colgrove v. Battin dissent: judicial
deference to administrative fact-finding constitutes “wholesale
abolition and replacement [of the jury] with a different institution
which functions differently, produces different results, and was wholly
unknown to the Framers of the Seventh Amendment.” 182
C. Deference to Administrative Fact-Finding is Contrary to the
Seventh Amendment’s “Legislative History”
Setting aside the criticized historical test (as many have suggested
the Supreme Court do), 183 scholars have shown that the legislative
history of the Seventh Amendment condemns in-house enforcement
actions and judicial deference to administrative fact-finding even more
harshly. 184 Recall that the ratification debate was a Herculean political

181. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 380 (1768).
182. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 166−67 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
183. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 26, at 148. (“The problem with the Supreme Court’s
historical test is that it is based on a fundamental misconception about the purposes of the
Seventh Amendment. In other words, to ponder whether English courts in 1791 would have
tried a particular cause of action to a jury is to ask the wrong question. This is because the
historical test is entirely without warrant in the historical record.”); JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY
JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES (2006) (criticizing
the historical test and arguing for a more fluid, modern approach); Wolfram, supra note 28, at
731, 747 (“That such an accident of history should continue to control application of the
seventh amendment would be justifiable only if there were available no other principled reading
of the amendment. . . . Perhaps it is too late for wholesale abandonment of the historical test, a
relatively firmly imbedded part of the law for over a century and a half. But recent musings of
the Supreme Court suggest that a re-thinking of the historical test might not be precluded by
stare decisis. If precedent is not an insurmountable obstacle, then one may hope that the time is
near when the dead hand of the historical test will be lifted from the seventh amendment.”);
Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury
Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1007 (1992) (“It is time to end this charade. The sooner we
confess that both as a matter of original intent and subsequent evolution, the Seventh
Amendment is not what we have made of it, the sooner our legal system will address the task of
defining civil jury rights in a way that is philosophically and jurisprudentially sound.”). But see
Czerwien, supra note 170, at 430 (“This Note argues that the Court’s historical test is in keeping
with the amendment’s scope and purpose.”).
184. Klein, supra note 37; Harrington, supra note 26; Scheiner, supra note 23.
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struggle between the Federalists who saw strong national government
as a stabilizing force for the fledgling nation, and the Antifederalists,
who saw strong national government as a threat to state government
and individual liberties. 185 The Federalists’ arguments carried the day
overall—the new Constitution was ratified and implemented—but the
Antifederalists forced some very important concessions. One of these
concessions was a constitutional amendment guaranteeing the right to
civil jury. 186 Indeed, “[t]he Antifederalist attitudes provide a relevant
position from which to negotiate with the insistent demands of
hierarchy, technocracy and the administrative state,” 187 and the
Seventh Amendment is best interpreted by reference to the
Antifederalist position. 188
One of the strongest and most common arguments the
Antifederalists put forth in favor of an explicit civil jury guarantee was
that the civil jury trial acts as a democratic check on governmental
tyranny. The American colonists despised that King George III had
authorized the vice-admiralty courts (which heard cases with no civil
jury) to enforce civil penalties against colonial subjects. 189 To allow an
arm of the federal government to effectively predetermine facts in
federal judicial proceedings is to revive vestiges of the very supposed

185. See, e.g., Federalist & Antifederalist Positions, POLYTECHNIC SCH.,
http://faculty.polytechnic.org/gfeldmeth/chart.fed.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
186. One more general matter should be emphasized concerning the debate between
the supporters of the proposed Constitution and the antifederalists who unsuccessfully
attempted to prevent its adoption: on the matter of civil jury trial the antifederalists
won. While many of their arguments concerning the form of the national government
and the extent of its power were ultimately rejected, the antifederalist arguments
concerning civil jury trial (and other guarantees that were enacted into the Bill of
Rights) ultimately prevailed.
Wolfram, supra note 28, at 672; see supra Section II.A.
187. Scheiner, supra note 23, at 148.
188. Id. (“Any attempt to create a vital civil jury trial right should be informed by the
rhetoric of those who fought for its preservation, and won that fight—primarily, the
Antifederalists. This is not to say that the ‘original understanding’ of the seventh amendment
must define its current contours, or that discovery of such an understanding is practicable or
possible. Antifederalist rhetoric does not offer definitions, but attitudes—suspicion toward
judicial power, fear that the government will serve the few against the many, and respect for the
civil jury as the last bulwark against oligarchy and the last redoubt of self-government.”); see also
Wolfram, supra note 28, at 672−73.
189. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 26.
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tyranny that the colonists fought to abolish in the
Revolutionary War. 190
In fact, among the Antifederalists’ justifications for demanding a
civil jury trial right was “protection against abuse by government
officials” 191 and “protection against biased or corrupt judges.” 192 This
argument is of particular relevance with regard to the relationship
between Article III courts and administrative agencies, because in
administrative adjudications, the potentially biased and abusive
government officials are the judges—the ALJs—who hear the dispute.
This is not an insubstantial possibility, given well-founded concerns
about the neutrality and unfairness of ALJs and administrative
proceedings generally. 193 The SEC’s ALJs, for example, have been

190. A far more immediate concern, however, was the fear that the national
government would utilize its legislative power to oppress the citizenry. Without specific
protection for the jury, antifederalists argued, Congress might enact tax or revenue
statutes that allowed a customs or excise officer to prosecute violations in federal courts
without juries. Such an argument, of course, rekindled all the old complaints about the
colonial vice-admiralty courts.
Id. at 186.
191. Id. at 185.
192. Id. at 187; see also Wolfram, supra note 29, at 670−71; Scheiner, supra note 23, at
148, 150 (listing aspects of the antifederalist “conception of the role of the civil jury,” which
include the civil jury as a “bulwark against ministerial tyranny,” and to “offset judicial bias in
favor of the government”).
193. Administrative agencies exist to promote efficiency in government. Despite the
utility of administrative proceedings, the importance and necessity of administrative
tribunals must also be examined in light of the atavistic concern the agency has in the
outcome of each case before them. Administrators, whose function includes
administering and implementing a stated legislative purpose, make administrative
determinations, not judges. Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), therefore, do not adopt
the judicial attitude of impartiality, but ‘rather the attitude of an executive who wants
to get a job done.’ Every search for the truth, and every effort at compensating the
wronged party must be tempered toward accomplishing the agency’s legislative charter.
To this end, some agencies have evidenced everything from antipathy to outright
discouragement of participation by outside counsel. Simply put, agencies are parties to
the very proceedings they conduct.
Heather Rutland, Civil Rights Are Civil Rights Are Civil Rights: The Inapplicability of Preclusion
to Unreviewed State Administrative Decisions, 20 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 199,
201−02 (2000); see also Elaine Golin, Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias in
Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1532 (1995); Jason D. Vendel, Note, General
Bias and Administrative Law Judges: Is There a Remedy for Social Security Disability Claimants?,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 770 (2005) (“Even though the regulations provide ALJs with
standards by which to evaluate claims, few will deny that bias inevitably seeps into their decisionmaking process. With some ALJs, however, bias more than seeps. It gushes. From racial, gender,
and class prejudice to bias against disability claimants in general, ALJs might possess—and exhibit
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criticized for being unfair to defendants. 194 To be faithful to the spirit
in which the Seventh Amendment was ratified, the Seventh
Amendment must be interpreted so as to provide jury protection from
the federal government.
Furthermore, if the Antifederalist position is any guide, the jury
trial right was intended to extend to civil enforcement actions. There
is evidence that the Antifederalists who ultimately drove the Seventh
Amendment’s passage 195 believed
that the jury was essential in cases involving suits between a citizen
and the national government as well as suits brought by the
government under the revenue laws. While the criminal jury
remained the most obvious protection against an oppressive
prosecution, the civil jury remained, they said, an essential weapon
against arbitrary enforcement of the government’s laws. A citizen’s
right to sue the officers of the government for violations of his rights
was a nullity without the right to put the case to a jury of his peers. 196

In a civil enforcement action like Atlas Roofing or post-DoddFrank SEC proceedings, this argument is most potent because the
government itself is directly levying the weight of the federal
government against the employer. 197 Indeed,

in their decisions—any viewpoint extant in the world. In some cases, the manifestations of such
biases would dismay even the most ardent advocates of judicial discretion, prompting the
question of how to remedy such bias. And in such a case, an aggrieved Social Security disability
claimant may be greatly disappointed as his lawyers are confronted with a procedural and
evidentiary nightmare.”); Epstein, supra note 134, at 492−93 (“[E]xpertise [in administrative
agencies] is an overrated virtue, while the risk of political capture by interest groups and the
discord that faction produces is an underappreciated vice.”).
194. Ryan, supra note 5; Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 22, 2015, 9:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-inspotlight-1448236970.
195. “Since the antifederalists were the generative force behind the seventh amendment, it
seems that their arguments should be given due weight in determining the purpose behind the
seventh amendment and should be resorted to as an aid in resolving interpretative problems that
arise under its language.” Wolfram, supra note 28, at 672−73.
196. Harrington, supra note 26, at 185; see also Wolfram, supra 28, at 670–71 (asserting
that one of the purposes of the Seventh Amendment, to the Antifederalists, was “the vindication
of the interests of private citizens in litigation with the government”).
197. Professor Wolfram notes that “[a]nother important function of the civil jury,
according to the antifederalists, was to provide the common citizen with a sympathetic forum in
suits against the government.” Wolfram, supra note 28, at 708. Surely this same reasoning applies
with extra vigor when the government is targeting the private individual.
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[f]or the Antifederalists, the civil jury would play a duel role in the
new Republic: it would protect the common people against the judges’
biases in favor of the government and the private ruling class, and also
establish a small preserve of direct self-government in the face of the
remote Federal regime. 198

If the executive branch’s factual determinations are practically final
and conclusive, then the employer is left with little protection indeed
against the possibility of a vindictive and abusive governmental
enforcement—which was the Antifederalists’ darkest fear.
Furthermore, responding to the Federalist argument “that
criminal juries [alone] were sufficient to guard against tyranny,” 199 an
idea still in currency today, one Antifederalist wrote:
Are there not a thousand civil cases in which the government is a
party?—In all actions for penalties, forfeitures and public debts, as
well as many others, the government is a party and the whole weight
of government is thrown into the scale of the prosecution[,] yet
these are all of them civil causes. . . . These modes of harassing the
subject have perhaps been more effectual than direct
criminal prosecutions. 200

Ultimately, even if allowing administrative agencies to adjudicate
disputes does not violate the constitutional principle of separation-ofpowers, such proceedings are independently unconstitutional for
other reasons. The lack of civil jury right in such proceedings, and the
limitations on federal judge review of administrative fact-finding,
creates serious Seventh Amendment problems when considered
against the legislative history and Antifederalist roots of the
Amendment. The Antifederalists saw the civil jury trial largely as a
substantive protection against the federal government, and specifically
envisioned that such a right would exist in cases between the federal
government and private citizens.

198. Scheiner, supra note 23, at 144 (emphasis added). SEC enforcement cases add a little
historical irony to this perspective, since those securities traders against whom the SEC brings
enforcement actions are often grouped into “the private ruling class” that corrupt judges
would favor.
199. Id. at 151.
200. Id., citing 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 28 (Hebert J. Storing ed., 1981).
However, “[n]ot all of those who supported the civil jury . . . may have intended that it be
guaranteed in cases involving the government as a party.” Scheiner, supra note 23, at 151 n.46.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Atlas Roofing ruled that judicial deference
to administrative fact-finding is constitutional under the Seventh
Amendment. 201 The Supreme Court in Atlas Roofing was also wrong.
Neither Congress nor the judiciary may simply ignore the
constitutional problems presented by jury-less trials before ALJs in
civil enforcement actions, or by judicial deference to administrative
fact-finding.
The legal community is not blind to the serious problems with the
civil jury. Critics complain that much legal analysis surpasses the
average juror’s comprehension. 202 Jury trials are expensive for
everyone involved—including the judiciary, which must provide
meals, lodging, and per diem payment for each juror. 203 Furthermore,
federal district courts are already overworked as it is. 204 Nevertheless,
the pros and cons of the civil jury are ultimately a policy question, and
it is a policy question that the United States settled in 1792 when the
Seventh Amendment was ratified. If our country wants to revisit that
question, it must do so by passing a constitutional amendment.
Whether under the Supreme Court’s flawed historical test or the
alternative legislative history analysis, the practice of deferring to
administrative fact-finding in Article III federal courts is an
infringement of the civil jury trial right enshrined in the Seventh
Amendment. And simply ignoring a portion of the Constitution, or
pretending that contradictions between labyrinthine jurisprudence

201. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 430 U.S.
442 (1977).
202. See, e.g., Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 YALE L.J.
1155 (May 1980); Alan Reifman, Spencer M. Gusick, & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Real Jurors’
Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 539 (Oct. 1992); Erin Fuchs,
This Is Why Juries Shouldn’t Decide Court Cases, BUS. INSIDER (July 3, 2014, 1:36 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/america-should-get-rid-of-the-jury-trial-2014-7.
203. Fuchs, supra note 202.
204. See, e.g., Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and
Wondering Where Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2015, 2:15 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courtsvacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b.s; Overloaded Courts, Not Enough Judges: The
Impact on Real People, PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY, http://www.pfaw.org/sites/default/
files/lower_federal_courts.pdf (citing Joe Palazzolo, In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile Up,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courts-civilcases-pile-up-1428343746; Alicia Bannon, Testimony: More Judges Needed in Federal Courts,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/
testimony-federal-courts-need-more-judges.
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and the apparent meaning of the constitutional text do not exist, only
serves to: compound the problem; lessen respect for the judiciary; and
cheapen the integrity of the other clauses of the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, there are two possible solutions to the problem.
The first option is to bring the Constitution in line with the
administrative state, through a formal amendment to the Constitution
in order to allow for jury-less administrative proceedings. The second
option is to bring the administrative state in line with the
Constitutional text, probably through amendments to the APA and
other administrative statutes. Both options have merit, and ultimately
will need to be decided in a detailed policy debate at the national level.
But one option must be chosen. The most historically justifiable
choice would be to require the SEC, and all similar administrative
agencies, to bring enforcement actions in an Article III court in the
first instance. Multiple avenues (some better than others) could
initiate this change: the Supreme Court could bring its case law more
in line with historical understanding of the civil jury trial right;
Congress could amend the APA and the SEC’s organic statute; even
the SEC could change its policy, to voluntarily discontinue bringing
enforcement actions before in-house tribunals. There, of course,
practical and logistical issues that would follow such a change, but
surely protection of liberty (safeguarded by the civil jury) must
outweigh efficiency concerns. Players in each of the three branches
have the power to solve the problem, even if only temporarily.
The longer the legal world pretends this problem does not exist,
the harder it will be to remedy the issue and establish a consistent legal
landscape in the future. 205 As we have seen, one hundred years of
administrative law has already ossified the judicial deference doctrine;
we must not let it go further. At some point, someone needs to point
out that the emperor has no clothes.
John Gibbons∗
206

205. Klein, supra note 37, at 1007 (“It is time to end this charade. The sooner we confess
that both as a matter of original intent and subsequent evolution, the Seventh Amendment is
not what we have made of it, the sooner our legal system will address the task of defining civil
jury rights in a way that is philosophically and jurisprudentially sound.”).
∗

J.D. candidate, April 2017, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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